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Optimal skew models explain reproductive sharing within social groups as resulting from reproductive incentives given by
controlling dominants to subordinate* in return for peaceful cooperation. We explore two versions of an alternative, the incom-
plete control model, for the evolution of reproductive sharing within groups. In this model, dominants have only limited control
over the allocation of reproduction and must expend effort to increase their share of the total group output We show that,
when the relatedness between dominant and subordinate is symmetrical, (1) the subordinate's fraction of reproduction either
increases with, or is insensitive to, the subordinate's genetic relatedness, r, to the dominant in both versions of the incomplete
control model, whereas the subordinate's fraction of reproduction decreases with increasing r in the optimal skew model, (2)
die subordinate's share of reproduction in the incomplete control model must exceed that in the optimal skew model, and (3)
ecological factors affecting solitary breeding success do not directly affect the subordinate's share of reproduction in incomplete
control model but do in the optimal skew model. When dominant-subordinate relatedness is asymmetrical (as is often the case
in parent—offspring associations), the incomplete control model predicts no reproduction by the subordinate offspring regardless
of group size for groups containing any mixture of unrelated and full-sibling subordinates, whereas the optimal skew models
predict that such reproduction is possible when the group size is three or more. The available evidence indicates a negative
relationship between relatedness and a subordinate's reproductive share in both vertebrate and hymenopteran societies, appar-
ently supporting the predictions of the optimal skew, not incomplete control, class of models. However, such a negative rela-
tionship is not necessarily inconsistent with the incomplete control model when, as is true for some vertebrate studies, it results
from a comparison of skews in genetically monogamous, nonincestuous groups of parents and their offspring (asymmetric
relatednesses) with skews in groups of nonkin (symmetric relatednesses). Both models predict higher skews in parent-offspring
associations. Occasional reproduction by subordinate offspring in groups of asymmetrical relatedness when such groups are
larger than dyads is more consistent with the optimal skew model, however. Overall, current data on reproductive skew and its
relationships to intragroup aggression and ecological constraints support the optimal skew model, but more data are needed
to rule out the incomplete control model. These models are examples of two different general views of Lntrasocietal evolution:
the tug-of-war view, in which group members engage in a struggle over resources, and the transactional view, in which group
members exchange parcels of reproduction to induce beneficial behavior from each other. Key words: conflict, cooperation,
cooperative breeding, eusociality, optimal skew, reproductive concessions, reproductive skew, sociality. [Behav Ecol 9:267—278
(1998)]
Much recent interest has focused on the factors that in-fluence the evolution of reproductive partitioning
among group members, in particular the degree to which
shared reproduction is biased in favor of dominant breeders
(Bourke and Franks, 1995; Bourke and Heinze, 1994; Bourke
et al., 1997; Creel and Waser, 1991; Emlen, 1982b, 1984,1995,
1996, 1997b; Emlen and Vehrencamp, 1983; Heinze, 1995;
Heinze et aL, 1995; Jamieson, 1997; Keane et al., 1994; Keller
and Reeve, 1994; Reeve, 1991, 1998; Reeve and Keller, 1995,
1996; Reeve and Nonacs, 1992; Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993; Veh-
rencamp, 1983a,b). In high-skew societies, direct reproduc-
tion u concentrated in one or a few dominant breeders in the
group; in low-skew societies, reproduction is distributed more
evenly among group members. Models of "optimal skew" in
reproduction attempt to explain the degree of skew by pre-
dicting the conditions under which dominant breeders should
yield just enough reproduction to a subordinate to make it
favorable for the subordinate to stay in the group and coop-
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crate peacefully rather than to leave the group and reproduce
independently or fight for exclusive control of the group's
resources. Reproductive payments that prevent subordinates
from leaving are called staying incentives; payments that pre-
vent subordinates from fighting to the death for complete
control of colony resources are called peace incentives (Reeve
and Ratnieks, 1993).
The first models of the evolution of reproductive skew an-
alyzed how ecological constraints on solitary reproduction, ge-
netic relatedness of potential breeders, and productivity ad-
vantages of peaceful association should influence the magni-
tudes of staying incentives in vertebrate and invertebrate so-
cieties (Emlen, 1982b, 1984; Emlen and Vehrencamp, 1983;
Reeve, 1991; Vehrencamp, 1979,1983a,b). Reeve and Ratnieks
(1993) extended these models by examining how relative
fighting ability among group members will interact with the
above factors to influence the reproductive skew via peace
incentives. The general conclusions of these classical skew
models are that the skew should increase (i.e., the reproduc-
tion should become less equitable) as (1) the relatedness be-
tween dominants and subordinates increases, (2) the proba-
268 Behavioral Ecology Vol. 9 No. 3
bility of successful solitary reproduction by the subordinate
decreases (i.e., for stronger ecological constraints), (3) the
subordinate's contribution to colony productivity increases
(because the larger this contribution, the less the subordinate
has to be compensated), and (4) the subordinate's relative
fighting ability decreases. Reeve and Keller (1995) recently
showed that the asymmetry in relatedness occurring in
mother-daughter associations versus sibling associations
should tend to increase the degree of skew in the former.
Emlen (1996) pointed out that inbreeding avoidance will re-
inforce the high skew in parent-offspring associations by shut-
ting down intragroup mating options; Reeve and Keller
(1996) showed that high skew is predicted even when subor-
dinates can mate outside of the group and then rear outbred
offspring within the group. Recent tests of these predictions
have generated striking, but preliminary, support for classical
optimal skew theory (Bourke and Heinze, 1994; Bourke and
Franks, 1995; Bourke et al., 1997; Creel and Waser, 1991; Em-
len, 1995, 1996, 1997b; Jamieson, 1997; Keane et aL, 1994;
Keller and Reeve, 1994; Reeve, 1998; Reeve and Keller, 1995;
Reeve and Nonacs, 1992).
Finally, the classical optimal skew theory has recently been
expanded to encompass the case in which dominants in two
or more colonies compete for the services of a helping sub-
ordinate (the "bidding game"; Reeve, 1998). In such a case,
breeder-subordinate relatedness is not predicted to affect the
reproductive skew, and, in further contrast to predictions of
die original skew models, the skew is predicted to decrease as
the subordinate's contribution to colony productivity increas-
es.
Both the rla«iral optimal skew model and the bidding
game model explain reproductive sharing as the offering of
reproductive incentives by dominants to subordinates, and
thus these models implicitly assume that dominants are in
control of die distribution of reproduction. Such models can
also be called "reproductive concessions" models (Qutton-
Brock T, in press) because the dominant concedes reproduc-
tion to the subordinate in return for die latter's cooperation.
Below we explore an alternative model for die evolution of
reproductive sharing within groups in which dominants have
only Umited control over the allocation of reproduction wid>
in groups, and reproductive sharing simply reflects a domi-
nant's inability to monopolize die group's reproduction. We
show that this "incomplete control" model makes some pre-
dictions different from those of the existing skew models. We
then assess which of die two models is best supported by ex-
isting data on reproductive sharing in both vertebrate and
invertebrate social groups. Finally, we point out diat die two
different models of reproductive skew are examples of two
different general classes of models of intra-colony conflict:
tug-of-war versus transactional models.
Role of genetic relatedness
As in the optimal skew models, we begin with die assumption
that two group members differ in dominance (Le., in some
characteristic, such as resource-holding power, thai potentially
leads to an asymmetry in reproduction). In optimal skew mod-
els, die amount of reproduction yielded by a dominant to a
subordinate is predicted to depend upon (1) the relatedness
between dominant and subordinate, (2) die subordinate's
prospects for successful reproduction if It leaves the g*»up
(Le., die severity of ecological constraints), and (3) die pro-
ductivity advantages of peaceful association. Thus, diree pa-
rameters enter into die basic skew model for dyadic groups:
r is die (symmetrical) relatedness of die dominant to the sub-
ordinate; * is the expected solitary reproduction by a potential
subordinate (relative to a standardized reproductive output
Table 1
Reproductive outputs for •<"•• '••" ' and subordinate in the danical
optimal ikew model
Subordinate
Mays
Subordinate
leaves
Dominant
Subordinate
equal to 1 for a dominant that is not joined by die subordi-
nate) , with lower values of x indicating harsher ecological con-
straints on independent breeding (we assume thai x s 1),
and k is die overall direct reproduction of a dyad (again rel-
ative to a standardized reproductive output equal to 1 for a
lone dominant). The resulting personal reproductive outputs
for bodi parties are summarized in Table 1.
Also as for optimal skew models, we will employ Hamilton's
rule for deciding which of two alternative strategies will be
favored by selection. That is, strategy » will be favored over
strategy; if
(P, - Pp
which is equivalent to
Pi +
- Jty > 0, (1)
(2)
where r is die coefficient of relatedness between die two in-
teractants, P, (or Pb is die personal reproduction associated
widi strategy i (or_/), and K, (or K£ is die odier party's repro-
duction if strategy i (or j) is performed. Parker (1989) has
shown in an important theoretical analysis that use of die
above additive version of Hamilton's rule is correct if domi-
nants and subordinates can be viewed as being in different
roles, with role being assigned randomly with respect to ge-
notype, and if gene expression is strictly conditional upon
role.
In die classical skew model, die proportion, pp of overall
direct reproduction yielded to die subordinate in a stable as-
sociation is diat which gives die subordinate just sufficient in-
centive to remain in die association rather than leave and
attempt to reproduce independendy. This is die "staying in-
centive" of Reeve and Ratnieks (1993) (previously called die
fitness "forfeited" by Emlen, 1982b). (For simplicity, we do
not consider here die case of peace incentives offered by dom-
inants to subordinates to prevent a fight to die deadi for ex-
clusive control of the group's resources; see Reeve and Rat-
nieks, 1993.) If ecological constraints are strong, correspond-
ing to die condition x < r(k — I), the subordinate will stay in
die association with no reproduction, diat is, p, = 0 (maxi-
mum skew). (The inequality is obtained by solving Hamilton's
rule for die subordinate, using die offspring numbers in Table
1 widi p, « 0.) If ecological constraints are moderate, i.e.,
r(k — 1) < x < k — 1, then die subordinate will receive a
staying incentive, die magnitude of which is
p,-*[x- r(k- !)]/*(! - r ) , (3)
which is obtained by using Hamilton's rule and Table 1 to
solve for the minimum fraction of reproduction required to
make staving (versus solitary breeding) favorable for die sub-
ordinate. The staying incentive decreases in magnitude
(meaning dot tile skew increases) as die relatedness, r, in-
creases, die total group output, k, increases, and die solitary
output, x, decreases. If ecological constraints are weak, cor-
responding to die condition x > k — 1 (requiring fcs2), die
subordinate is favored to leave and reproduce solitarily (Em-
len, 1982a; Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993; Vehrencamp, 1983a).
Now consider a model in which die dominant has incom-
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plete control over the subordinate's reproduction. Suppose
that x < k — 1 but that the dominant cannot profitably reduce
the subordinate's reproduction to the "break-even point," pe
at which staying is just favored over solitary reproduction, with
the result that the subordinate's fraction of reproduction al-
ways exceeds its staying incentive. (If the dominant could prof-
itably push the subordinate's reproduction to this lower limit,
the classical optimal skew model would apply because the
dominant must always yield the staying incentive, lest it lose
the subordinate and thus any reproductive benefits conferred
by the latter.) The dominant must decide how much effort to
expend in increasing its fraction of the total reproduction at
the expense of total group output [see Reeve and Nonacs
(1997) for a model of how such selfish effort should vary with
the value of the subordinate to the dominant]. The subordi-
nate likewise must decide how much effort to expend in in-
creasing its share of the reproduction (also at the expense of
total group output). Increasing effort by either the dominant
or subordinate is likely to reduce total group output by in-
creasing the fraction of the dyad's total energy reserves that
is channeled into selfish augmentation of the share of repro-
duction (e.g., via physical conflict over access to group re-
sources) instead of into offspring production and parental
and alloparental care. This loss of total output may place a
limit on the optimal effort for the dominant (and perhaps on
that of the subordinate as well), and sharing of reproduction
may result.
To consider the latter possibility formally, we constructed
two explicit models in which the dominant and subordinate
use part of the group's resources to engage in a "tug-of-war"
over the share of reproduction within the group. We assumed
.for simplicity that the group's total productivity is a linearly
increasing function of the fraction of the group's resources
that is not expended in the tug-of-war. In the first model, the
subordinate inefficiency model, we assume that subordinates
are less efficient than dominants in converting resources to
an increased share of reproduction. In the second model, the
restricted access model, we assume equal efficiencies, but that
the subordinate controls at most a fixed fraction / and the
dominant a greater fraction 1 — / of the resources.
Subordinate inefficiency model
In this model, dominance is determined by resource-holding
power. The dominant freely allocates a fraction x, and the
subordinate freely allocates a fraction y, of the group's re-
sources to the tug-of-war (x and y are thus the selfish efforts
described above). The fraction of reproduction going to the
dominant is x/(x + by) and to the subordinate is by/(x + by);
i.e., the net skew depends on the ratio of resources allocated
by the two interactants to the tug of war (we stipulate that if
both x and y equal zero, reproduction is shared equally). The
constant A is a number greater than zero and less than or
equal to one, reflecting the subordinate's possibly greater in-
efficiency in converting resources to an increased share of the
reproduction (e.g., its smaller relative fighting ability). Thus,
the greater the dominant's efficiency (e.g., relative fighting
ability), the smaller b is, and the greater is the dominant's
share of the reproduction (i.e., its net "pull" in the tug-of-
war) for a given x and y. Note that, by contrast, the dominant's
efficiency has no effect on the staying incentive of the classical
optimal skew model.
The discrete form of Hamilton's rule indicates that, for a
member of a dyadic group, selection should maximize the
inclusive fitness pk + rfl — p)k or, equrvalentfy, k[r + (I — r)p]
where p is the selfish share of reproduction and k is the total
group output. By the assumptions of the subordinate ineffi-
cency model, the dominant's inclusive fitness is thus
/„ = (1 - x-y) [ r + (1 - r)x/(x + by)] (4)
and the subordinate's inclusive fitness is
/, - (1 - x - y) [r + (1 - r)by/(x + by)] (5)
We seek the Nash equilibrium (x* y*) (i.e., the values x*and
y* that are mutual best replies; Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992),
with the payoffs being calculated from Equations 4 and 5. In
this case, the Nash equilibrium is obtained by finding the pos-
itive values x* and y* satisfying
dljbx = 0; dljdy = 0 at x » *•; and y = y*.
These solutions are
2 - r(l - b)
- 1
and
2(1 - b) 1 -
2b + r(l - b)
V r ' ( l - 46 (6)
The evolutionarily stable skew (dominant's share of repro-
duction) is
x*/(x* + by*) " 2 - r(l - b) + V r ' ( l - b)1 + 4b (7)
A rather counterintuitive prediction of the model (seen
from a plot of y* — x*for the biologically meaningful ranges
of r and b) is that subordinate effort should always be higher
than the dominant's effort (y*>x~), despite the fact that the
subordinate's inefficiency causes it to always capture less than
half of the total reproduction (by*<x*). Thus, the model pre-
dicts higher levels of attempted selfishness by subordinate
than by dominant individuals.
All biologically meaningful solutions ( 0 S r < l and O s j
< 1) for the dominant effort and the skew are shown as the
surfaces in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the dominant's effort
decreases with increasing rand increases with the subordinate
efficiency factor, b (the latter occurs because a subordinate
with a higher b is more competitive, requiring greater selfish-
ness by the dominant to secure a given fraction of the repro-
duction). It is also shown that the evolutionarily stable skew
declines with increasing b, but is virtually insensitive to relat-
edness. The maximum effect of relatedness is observed when
b = 0.12 (i.e., for exceptionally weak subordinates), but even
for this value of b, the dominant's share of reproduction only
increases by 0.15 as relatedness increases from 0 to 1. The
principal conclusion of this tug-of-war model is that related-
ness will have virtually no effect on reproductive skew, pri-
marily because relatedness changes the evolutionarily stable
dominant and subordinate efforts (x* y*) in the same direc-
tion and to extents that are roughly inversely proportional to
their effects on skew (see appendix).
Our conclusions appear robust with respect to variation in
the assumptions of the subordinate inefficiency model. For
example, we assumed that the share of reproduction depend-
ed on the ratio of energies invested in the tug-of-war. It is
possible that in some contexts the relevant ratio is some power
function of the invested energies with the power being other
than 1. However, this makes litde difference to die prediction
that skew will be essentially insensitive to relatedness (Figure
2). In addition, we might assume that only some fraction of
the colony resources are economically contestable and that
the tug-of-war applies only to the remaining fraction; such an
assumption would only further dilute the extremely weak re-
lationship between skew and relatedness. This insensitivity to
relatedness contrasts sharply with the reproductive skew pre-
dicted by die optimal skew models (Figure 3).
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Figure 1
Subordinate inefficiency tug-of-war model (lymmetrical relatednesi
between dominant and subordinate). (Top) Dominant'i
evolutionarily stable effort ai a function of both subordinate's
fighting efficiency, b, and their genetic relatedness, r, (bottom)
Evolutionary stable fraction of dyad reproduction going to the
dominant as a function of both subordinate's righting efficiency and
their genetic relatedness.
Arbitrary group size and asymmetrical relatedness. The pre-
ceding model was developed for the special case of symmet-
rical relatedness and dyadic groups. The model can be gen-
eralized for groups of any genetic composition and arbitrary
size n by rinding the combination of n x values that are Nash
equilibria (obtained as above) corresponding to the n inclu-
sive fitness expressions, with the inclusive fitness of the _/th
individual given by
( . \i - 2 x, 2 *.-«.- (8)
where rt is the relatedness of the focal individual to the ah
individual's offspring, divided by the focal individual's relat-
edness to its own offspring (henceforth referred t» as the "af-
fective relatedness"), b, is the »th individual's efficiency, and
*i is the ith individual's effort. Numerical results from the
more general model suggest that the insensitivity of skew to
relatedness is not restricted to groups of two members but will
usually occur unless group sizes are relatively large and sub-
ordinates are very inefficient (Figure 4).
T I
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Figure 2
Insensitivity of dominant's fraction of reproduction (x* / [x* +
by**]) to the value of the exponent a in the subordinate
inefficiency tug-of-war model, b «• 030 (symmetrical relatedness).
The general model can be used to analyze the case of asym-
metrical relatedness between dominant and subordinate.
Asymmetrical relatedness refers to associations where the par-
ticipants are unequally related to each other's offspring, as
when the dominant is a parent of the subordinate. The defi-
nition of r, allows for asymmetrical relatedness: assuming sin-
gle mating and no inbreeding, an offspring is effectively re-
lated to its parent by 1.0, because young full siblings are ge-
tptimalskew
tug-of-war:
ratriettd meets*
optimal skew
tug-of-war:
•raboniutaXt mtffckmcj
0 . 4 0 , (
"O O.B
l
O.f
O.I
0.7
O.t
O.f
0.2 0.4 0.S O.t 1
optimal skew
restricted access
tug-of-war
0.2 0.4 O.t
relatedness
Figure 3
Dominant's share of reproduction versus genetic relatednesa in the
optimal skew model compared to the subordinate inefficiency and
restricted access tug-of-war models (symmetrical relatedness). (Top
and middle) x « 030; * = 2. (Bottom) Opposing effects of
relatedneu in the optimal skew and some solutions to the restricted
access models: x « 030; A - 2 ; / - 0.10. Note that the dominant's
share in the tug-of-war (incomplete control) models cannot exceed
that in the optimal skew model lest the dominant lose the
subordinate and thus the benefits of grouping.
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- 1)*^,/ .^, - 2x
*-(« " 1) (9)
Fifun 4
Insensitivity of dominant's share of reproduction to rehtedneas in
the subordinate inefficiency model across differently sized groups
(symmetrical relatednesc groups include one dominant and
multiple subordinates with equal efficiencies b).
netically as valuable as offspring, whereas, the parent is related
to the offspring by only 0.50. Remarkably, for many firequendy
occurring kinds of groups (e.g., any mixture of full sibling
and unrelated subordinates), and whenever the parent has
higher efficiency or access to more resources than its subor-
dinate offspring, the evolutionarily stable effort by the off-
spring will be zero, regardless of the size or genetic compo-
sition of die rest of the group (see appendix). This occurs
because a subordinate offspring's genetic interests completely
overlap with those of the parent in this situation (effective
relatedness, r, to parent " 1.0), but die interests of die parent
do not completely overlap widi diat of die offspring (r,» V4).
The result is that the parental optimum (Le., some positive
effort by die parent and zero effort by die offspring) is an
optimum for the offspring as well. Unfortunately, die optimal
skew model also predicts zero reproduction of a subordinate
offspring when die dominant parent is die only other mem-
ber of the group (Reeve and Keller, 1995). Thus, complete
skew is predicted for an outbreeding parent-offspring dyad
by both die optimal skew and incomplete control models, so
such skews cannot be used to distinguish between die two
models.
However, die predictions of die two models can diverge
even for parent-offspring groups under two special condi-
tions. First, die asymmetry in relatedness widiin parent-off-
spring associations can disappear whenever (1) a mate change
occurs between successive breedings [i.e., a subordinate off-
spring has die same effective relatedness to die parent (0.25/
0.50 = 0.50) as die parent does to it (0.25/0.50 =• 0.50) when
die subordinate's young siblings are half-siblings], or (2) in-
cestuous breeding occurs between die dominant parent and
subordinate offspring (e.g., in diploid species, a non-inbred,
parent and its offspring have effectively equal relatedness to
their joint offspring). In these special cases, die symmetrical-
relatedness classical skew models will still apply.
Second, when groups widi asymmetrical relatedness consist
of more than two individuals, a subordinate offspring can re-
ceive some reproduction in die optimal skew model in cases
where it cannot in die incomplete control model. To see diis
for one special case of die optimal skew model, suppose diere
is one dominant parent and m (22) full-sibling subordinate
offspring. All breeders avoid inbreeding. Let pf and A, be die
staying incentive for each subordinate and die group output,
respectively, for a group of size g. Using Hamilton's rule, die
staying incentive for each subordinate in a group of size m is
This staying incentive will be positive and yielded by die dom-
inant under die condition a/(m + 1) < x < a/2 where a ~
2(*_ - *__,) + * i^^ »_i(»»» - 1). Thus, reproduction by sub-
ordinate offspring in die presence of a dominant parent is
possible in die optimal skew model for m>l but not in die
incomplete control model when subordinates are full siblings.
RtstricUd acctss modd
In die restricted access model, dominance is determined by a
prior asymmetry in accumulated resources. We begin with the
rase of symmetrical relatedness in a dyadic group and assume
diat me subordinate has access to only a proportion / (< V4)
of die group's resources, of which it freely allocates a fraction,
w, to die tug-of-war, and die dominant has access to a greater
proportion (1 — ft of die group's resources, of which it freely
allocates a fraction, z, to the tug-of-war, in diis model, domi-
nant and subordinate have equivalent efficiencies. For exam-
ple, diis situation might arise if a dominant and subordinate
form an association only after they have procured and stored
resources to be used in bodi reproduction and parental care
(widi die dominant having stored more resource). For ex-
ample, diis situation might apply to associations of co-found-
ing ant queens. The tug-of-war might dien consist of resource-
depleting competition over die apportionment of parentage
in a clutch diat will subsequently receive joint parental care.
By die above assumptions, die dominant's inclusive fitness
is now equal to
r+( l - r)- /)z+/wj(1- / )
and die subordinate's inclusive fitness is
(10)
(11)
We dien solve for die evolutionarily stable solutions t* and
w*, as above. The solutions in diis case are
(1 - »)/4(l -ft and w* = (1 - r)/4/
if r a 1 - 4 /
and
r* = and w* - 1 if r < 1 - 4 / (12)
As in die subordinate inefficiency model, die evolutionarily
stable effort of die subordinate always exceeds diat of die
dominant, despite die fact diat die subordinate controls a
smaller fraction of die resources. Thus, both models predict
higher levels of attempted selfishness by subordinates dian by
dominants.
If r 2 1 — 4/ die somewhat surprising result is diat die
evolutionarily stable share of die dominant's reproduction—
i.e., z*{\ - f)/[z*{\ - f) + fu>*]—is exactly Vi, indepen-
dendy of relatedness or die subordinate's fraction of resources
/ This is because as relatedness increases, both dominant and
subordinate efforts decrease. A comparison of w* and z* in
Equation 12 shows diat die subordinate's effort decreases fast-
er than the dominant's effort as relatedness increases. How-
ever, die faster decrease for a subordinate is exactly compen-
sated by die smaller effect of die subordinate's effort on die
resulting skew (i.e., by die fact diat die subordinate's effort is
weighted by just / compared to greater value 1 — / for die
dominant).
If T < 1 — 4/ die subordinate's evolutionarily stable effort
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is a constant ui* " 1, corresponding to an endpoint maxi-
mum, and the share of the dominant's reproduction is
1 - (13)
which decreases with increasing r. Thus, as r increases in this
model, the skew decreases until r exceeds the threshold 1 —
4/ at which point the reproduction is perfectly equitable re-
gardless of further increases in relatedness (Figure 3). Thus,
increased relatedness tends to lead to lower skew. In fact, it is
generally true that, when the subordinate's effort is constant,
die dominant's optimal effort and thus the skew should de-
crease as r increases (see appendix). In summary, in the re-
stricted access model, skew either is constant or decreases as
relatedness between dominant and subordinate increases.
Arbitrary group size and asymmetrical relatedness. The re-
stricted access model was developed for the special case of
symmetrical relatedness and dyadic groups. The model can be
generalized for groups of any genetic composition and arbi-
trary size n by finding the combination of values of x that are
Nash equilibria (obtained as above) corresponding to the n
inclusive fitness expressions, with the inclusive fitness of the
jch individual given by
\
(14)
The general model can be used to analyze the case of asym-
metrical relatedness between dominant and subordinate, just
as in the subordinate inefficiency model. As in the latter mod-
el, die evolutionarily stable effort by a subordinate offspring
is zero whenever it is in a group with a dominant parent and
any mixture of full-sibling and unrelated subordinates (ap-
pendix). Again, this prediction is not necessarily true in the
optimal skew model when groups are larger than dyads (see
Equation 9).
Overall, we conclude, from both the subordinate inefficien-
cy and the restricted access tug-of-war versions of the incom-
plete control model, that increasing relatedness either de-
creases or does not appreciably affect the reproductive skew
when relatedness between dominant and subordinate is sym-
metrical. Both predictions contrast with the corresponding
prediction of the classical optimal skew models (Figure 3). It
is possible that more complicated models of incomplete con-
trol could be constructed to predict a positive effect of relat-
edness on skew, but we think it is telling that the simplest and
most intuitive models we could construct make the prediction
of either virtually no effect or a negative effect. The latter
predictions are likely to have considerable generality for the
following reasons: as relatedness increases in incomplete con-
trol models, either (1) die dominant and subordinate both
should decrease their selfish efforts, with die result that there
is little net effect on skew, or (2) only the dominant should
decrease its effort (because the subordinate always exerts its
maximal effort), with die result that there is a negative effect
of relatedness on skew. As indicated by our analyses, it is un-
likely that die dominant will exhibit a constant, maximal effort
and die subordinate a flexible effort (leading to a positive
Folaaenship between ^arffdnrv and skew). The dominant,
by definition, has greater fighting ability or access to resources
than does the subordinate; dius, its optimal effort is less likely
to be pushed to an upper limit than is die subordinate's.
The incomplete control and optimal skew models also make
distinct predictions in die case of asymmetrical relatedness.
When there are more than two group members, the subor-
dinate offspring is often predicted to reproduce in the opti-
mal skew (see Equation 9) but not in die incomplete control
models (see Appendix).
- Optimal skew versus incomplete control models: role of geological
constraints
The parameter x (solitary reproductive output standardized
relative to die output of a lone dominant) is an inverse mea-
sure of ecological constraints on independent breeding. In
the optimal skew model, x profoundly affects die reproductive
skew because die dominant concedes just enough reproduc-
tion to die subordinate for die latter to reach its "break-even
point," and this point obviously depends on * (see Equation
3). In die incomplete control model, by contrast, die subor-
dinate always reproduces above die break-even point (i.e., ob-
tains more than its staying incentive), and die partitioning of
reproduction is not directly influenced by x. If die dominant
reduces die subordinate's reproduction to diis "break-even
point," die incomplete control model becomes identical to
the optimal skew model. Note diat even in die incomplete
control models, die dominant can never force die subordi-
nate to obtain less than its staying incentive (Equation 3) be-
cause die subordinate would then be favored to leave the
group and attempt to breed independendy. This would de-
prive die dominant of the assumed benefits of grouping.
Optimal skew versus incomplete control models: summary of
predictions
The classical optimal skew and incomplete control models
make very different predictions about the regulation of die
subordinate's share of reproduction, both when relatedness is
symmetrical and when it is asymmetrical.
Symmetrical relatedness. According to die incomplete con-
trol model, die subordinate's fraction of reproduction will ei-
ther increase widi, or be quite insensitive to, die relatedness,
r, whereas die subordinate's fraction of reproduction will de-
crease with increasing relatedness in the classical optimal skew
modeL
According to the incomplete control model, both die dom-
inant and the subordinate will exert decreasing effort (e.g.,
aggression) to enhance their shares of group reproduction,
as dieir relatedness increases. At all values of % the subordi-
nate's effort will exceed diat of die dominant. In contrast, in
die rlawiral skew models, increased relatedness will increase
die skew. This in turn will increase die payoffs bodi for the
subordinate's aggressive testing of dominants and for die
dominant's advertisement of its alpha status. Aggression by
bodi parties is therefore predicted to be higher with closer
kinship in die optimal skew model (Reeve and Keller, 1997;
Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993).
In the incomplete control model, ecological constraints af-
fecting i do not influence the partitioning of reproduction
(except through correlation with die parameters r and k),
whereas in die classical optimal skew model die subordinate's
share of reproduction decreases as x decreases (i.e., as eco-
logical constraints increase; Equation 3). A closely related die-
oretical result is diat die subordinate's share of reproduction
in die incomplete control model will often markedly exceed
diat specified by the rtevti'fi optimal skew model when relat-
edness is symmetrical (Figure 3).
Asymmetrical relatedness (parent-offspring associations).
When a subordinate offspring is present in a group with a
dominant parent and any mixture ef falt^ling and unrelat-
ed subordinates, the subordinate is predicted to exert zero
effort and dius obtain no direct reproduction in die incom-
plete control model (in die absence of inbreeding; appen-
dix) . In contrast, die subordinate offspring can receive repro-
duction in die optimal ikew model, but only if such groups
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Table 2
Degree of reproductive ikew in cooperatively breeding birds in relation to relatedness between potential co-breeders
Relatedness between
potential co-breeders
Reproductive skew*
Females Males Reference
Intraspecific comparisons
Galimula chioropus (common gallinule)
High (mother-daughter nests)
Low (unrelated female nests)
Pofphyrio porphyrio (pukeko)
High (Shakespean North island)
Low (Otokia: South island)
Merops buUockoidts (white-fronted bee-eater)
Average r of beta male to dominant pair
High (r - 0.5)
Moderate (r = 0.25)
Low ( r < 0.25)
Ntsomimis galapagetmsis (Galapagos mockingbird)
Higher (Champion Island)
Lower (Genovesa Island)
Acrocephatus stchttUnsis (Seychelles' warbler)
Higher (Cousin island)
Lower (Aride island)
Interspecific comparisons: congeneric
Aphdocoma cotrulactns vs. A. uitramarina (Florida vs. Mexican jay)
Higher (coerulescens) 100%« NA
Lower (uitramarina) 63% NA
Calonltn colHei vs. C formosa (black-throated vs. white-throated magpie jay)
Higher (colliei) 89%4 NA
Lower (formosa) 80% NA
Intergeneric comparisons
Tribonyx mortieri vs. Gallinula trrubrosa (Tasmanian hen vs. Dusky moorhen)
. High (T. mortUri) 100%7 8S%7
Low (G. Urubrosa) Low8 Low8
ParabuUo unicinaus vs. BuUo galapagoensis (Harris' hawk vs. Galapagos hawk)
High (P. unicmctus) NA 100%»
Low (B. galapagomsis) NA 60%7
61%'
49%*
0.17«
0.04*
NA
NA
NA
90%4 '
48%
55%s
Lower
NA
NA
0.391
0.25
S6%»
18%
0%*
NA
NA
NA
NA
McRae (1996)
Jamieson (1997)
Emlen and Wrege (1995
Curry (1989)
Curry and Grant (1990)
I. Komdeur (personal cc
Woolfenden and Fitzpatrick (1984)
Brown (1986)
Winterstein (1985)
Innes (1992)
Gibbsetsd. (1994)
Garnett (1980)
Faaborgh and Bednarz (1990)
Faaborgh et al. (1995).
• Method of estimating skew: '% of incubated eggs at joint nests with two females present that were laid by the dominant female; • skew
calculated by method of Pamilio and Croiier (1996); '% of mated subordinates whose prebreeding or breeding activities were disrupted by
the dominant pair; *% of reproductive events in groups with >1 female in which the dominant female is the breeder; 5% of eggs laid in
groups with >1 female which are laid by the dominant female; *% of successful nestings in groups with >1 female in which the dominant
female is the breeder; 7% of young hatched from nests with >1 potential breeder that were produced by die dominant (as determined by
DNA fingerprinting); "based on statements that; "all males copulated with all females," "no differences in sexual success between individual
birds were detected," and "where one group contains two females, both lay in the same nest" (Garnett, 1980: 103, 108, 110; "based on
electrophoredc analysis of 4 young, plus intensive observations showing that all copulations involved the dominant male, and subordinate
males "showed no interest in copulating." Asterisk (*) denotes significant within-pair difference at the p < .05 level.
contain at least one same-sex subordinate in addition to the
parent and the offspring. Thus, all else being equal, the oc-
currence of subordinate reproduction in asymmetric parent-
offspring groupings is more consistent with the optimal skew
than with the incomplete control model.
High levels of aggressive testing by subordinates and of as-
sertion' of status by dominants are not predicted by either
model, but for parent-offspring associations larger than dy-
ads, aggression is predicted to be higher by the optimal skew
than by the incomplete control modeL This difference arises
because, for such groups, the genetic interest of the subor-
dinate offspring is the same as that of the dominant parent
in the incomplete control model, but it is not the same in the
optimal skew model, as indicated by the fact that the domi-
nant parent must yield staying incentives to subordinate off-
spring under a wide range of conditions (Equation 9).
In the incomplete control model, the degree of skew will
be largely unaffected by the magnitude of ecological con-
straints affecting x. Optimal skew models make the same pre-
diction, but only for the restricted case of dyadic associations.
In larger parent-offspring associations, ecological constraints
can affect skew, with the subordinate's share of reproduction
again decreasing as x decreases (Equation 9).
We next examine data drawn from both vertebrate and hy-
menopteran societies that address these predictions.
Review of the available evidence
Reproductive skew as a function of relatedness
Sufficient data are available from long-term studies of coop-
eratively breeding birds to allow a preliminary test of the mod-
els. Using a pairwise comparisons test to control for differ-
ences in phytogeny (Msller and Birkhead, 1992), both intra-
specific and interspecific comparisons support the rla^irai
optimal skew prediction that dominants obtain a greater share
of,the reproduction as the relatedness between dominants
and subordinates increases (Table 2). A sign test across com-
parisons reveals a significant tendency for skews in groups
with high relatedness to exceed those in groups with low re-
latedness (intraspecific comparisons, n = 6, p = .016; inter-
specific comparisons, n => 5; p = .03).
Superficially, these data support the optimal skew, not the
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incomplete control, predictions. However, many of the com-
parisons are between groups of parents and offspring (possi-
bly asymmetrical relatedness) and groups of unrelated indi-
viduals (symmetrical relatedness) and could still be consistent
with the incomplete control models because the latter, like
optimal skew theory, predicts relatively high skews in domi-
nant parent-subordinate offspring associations (appendix).
These cases require further analysis. Below we examine three
cases in detail.
Among common moorhens (GaOmula chloropus), two fe-
males often lay eggs communally in the same nest When this
occurs, the second female may be either an unrelated adult
or a grown daughter of the senior female. McRae (1996) cal-
culated the proportion of eggs belonging to the senior female
as a measure of skew. This proportion was significantly greater
when the junior female was her daughter than when the fe-
males were unrelated, results that McRae (1996) interpreted
as supportive of optimal skew theory. However, McRae further
reported that in all cases where junior females were daugh-
ters, they mated incestuously with their fathers. In this specific
case of inbreeding, the daughter's effective relatedness to the
mother is likely to be greater than the reverse relatedness (r,
=> % and V4, respectively, as defined for Equation 8), and thus
the incomplete control model can also explain the higher
skew in the parent—offspring groups (i.e., the dominant's ef-
fort relative to the subordinate's effort is higher in the par-
ent-offspring groups).
Pukeko (Porpkyrio porpkyrio) are communally breeding gal-
linules that form mate-sharing groups of one to four males
and one to two females. A single nest is built, and most adults
assist in rearing the young. Jamieson (1997) reported large
geographic variation in the social organization of this species
in New Zealand. On North Island, breeding groups are com-
posed of close kin (offspring are retained to form families),
while on South Island they are composed of unrelated coali-
tions of adults. As with moorhens, incestuous matings were
common on North Island, but the inbreeding involves both
parent-offspring and sib-sib matings (Craig and Jamieson,
1988). In this case, the mean effective relatedness between
dominant and subordinate may be nearly symmetrical, de-
pending on the frequencies of the kinds of inbreeding: (1) if
subordinates mate with the controlling (i.e., skew-determin-
ing) parent, effective relatedness can be symmetrical; (2) if
subordinates mate with the nonconffelliag parent, there can
be an asymmetry in which the subordinate's effective relat-
edness is greater (as in moorhens); and (3) if subordinates
mate with siblings, there can be an asymmetry in which the
dominant's effective relatedness is greater. DNA fingerprint-
ing has shown that reproductive skew is greater for both sexes
on North Island, where the subordinates typically are off-
spring of a dominant pair. This finding appears to support
the optimal skew model predictions given the likelihood of
an overall nearly symmetrical relatedness (Jamieson, 1997).
White-fronted bee-eaters (Merops builodunda) live in so-
cially monogamous, extended family groupings in which mul-
tiple pairs may reproduce simultaneously. Different family
members "disagree" over reproduction, however, with domi-
nants sometimes actively disrupting the prebreeding or breed-
ing activities of subordinates. Although this at first sounds like
a tug-of-war, it follows the prediction of optimal skew theory.
F.Tarnining only cases of symmetrical relatedness (parent+
stepxparem-ef&pmg, brothoc^bcother, lesser nondescendent
kin-ego, and nonkin—nonkin), the likelihood of subordinate
breeding increases as relatedness to the dominant(s) decreas-
es (data from Emlen and Wrege, 1992).
Three other cases of egalitarian breeding have been re-
ported among cooperatively breeding birds. These are Gala-
pagos hawks (Buteo galapagpcnsis), groove-billed anis (Croto-
phaga stddrostris), and guira cuckoos (Guira guira). In each,
the multiple breeders have been found to be unrelated indi-
viduals (Faaborg et aL, 1995; Koford et aL, 1990; Quinn et aL,
1994). This association broadly supports the optimal skew
models because if the incomplete control models were largely
correct, we should be just as likely (or more likely) to find
egalitarian reproduction among symmetrically related kin
such as siblings as among non-kin.
Among mammals, two studies provide more support for the
optimal skew models. Dwarf mongooses (HdogaU parvula)
live in groups of 3-18 individuals. A dominant "pair" typically
monopolizes reproduction, but 13% of subordinate females
produce litters and 24% of young are sired by subordinate
males. For both sexes, there are numerous subordinate* pres-
ent in the group, but the few that reproduce are those least
related to the dominants; moreover, the amount of reproduc-
tion they receive appears close to the theoretical staying in-
centive of the optimal skew model (Creel and Waser, 1991;
Keane et aL, 1994). Among male lions (Pcmthera leo), repro-
duction is also shared more equitably when groups are com-
posed of unrelated individuals than when they consist of sib-
lings (i.e., symmetrically related kin; Packer et aL, 1991).
Data from social insects also provide support for the opti-
mal skew models. As reviewed by Keller and Reeve (1994),
unrelated ant foundress queens appear to divide reproduc-
tion equitably, in contrast to associations of closely and sym-
metrically related wasp queens, among which reproduction
typically is greatly skewed in favorpf a single dominant female.
Recent genetic data on the communal bees Perdita Uxana and
Andrrna jacobi also showed that nest-mate queens are only
distantly related and, as predicted by optimal skew models,
they do contribute relatively equally to reproduction (Dan-
forth et aL, 1996; Paxton et aL, 1996). An intrageneric com-
parison (Reeve 1991) also hints at an association between the
degree of reproductive skew and relatedness in the genus Pol-
istes, with lower-skew societies being composed of symmetri-
cally related queens of lower relatedness.
Evidence for a relationship between reproductive skew and
relatedness among queens also comes from intergeneric and
intrageneric comparisons among ants. Intergeneric data on
both reproductive skew and relatedness from the same pop-
ulations are available for four species (Table 3). Among these
species there is a perfect rank correlation between reproduc-
tive skew and genetic relatedness, with skew increasing as re-
latedness increases. The association of high skew with high
relatedness is exhibited even between different populations of
the same species of Leptothorax aceruorum (Bourke et aL,
1997). These data can be reconciled with the incomplete con-
trol models only if the higher-skew societies have higher pro-
portions of queens that are offspring (asymmetrically related)
to the dominant queen.
The same positive association between queen—queen relat-
edness and reproductive skew was found in an intrageneric
comparison within the ant genus Ltptoihorax. In some Lepto-
thorax species, all queens contribute to reproduction (polyg-
yny), whereas in some others a single queen monopolizes all
of the reproduction (functional monogyny). As predicted by
optimal skew models, the relatedness among nest-mate
queens is higher in the functionally monogvnous species
(high skew) than in the five potygynous species (lower skew)
(Table 4). Taken together, these data are most consistent with
hijgh skew being associated with high relatedness in ants. How-
ever, cadGdn B mcesssry because data are available for only
a few species, and the possibility and extent of asymmetric
relatedness between subordinates and dominants, particularly
in the functionally monogvnous species, has yet to be inves-
tigated. Moreover, there is a negative correlation between
queen-queen relatedness and queen number in ants (Keller,
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Rjcprotlucuyc skew n d rdstcdocM in mts
Species Skew Measure Reference Relatedness Reference
LhupUhtma bainalt
(previously Mdarmtjrmtx huM&s)
Soltnopsis mvicta
Leptothorax actrvorum
Leptothorax gndltri
0.02
0.09
0.12
0.42
1.00
Egg-laying rates
Parentage of workers
Egg-laying rates
Parentage of workers
Egg^aying rates
Keller (1988, unpublished
data)
Ross (1988)
Bourke and Franks (1995)
BourkeetaL (1997)
Bourke and Franks (1995)
0.05
0.08
0.26
0.48
0.60
Kanfmann M al (1QP9)
Ross (1993)
Heinze et aL (1995)
Bourke et aL (1997)
Heinze (1995)
We considered only species for which data on reproductive skew and queen-queen relatedness were obtained from the same population.
Relatedness among queens may vary greatly among populations (see Keller, 1995), and it is unknown whether such differences may correlate
with differences in reproductive skew.
1995), so that variation in queen number might be a con-
founding variable influencing skew independently of relat-
edness. finally, as Heinze (1995) pointed out, high related-
ness among queens within colonies might result from high
skew (rather than the reverse) when queens are readopted
into their native colony, as indeed is probably the case in many
potygynous ant species (Chapuisat et al., 1997; Keller, 1995;
Stille and Stille, 1992; Stuart et al., 1993). For such species,
additional studies are needed to uncover die causal role of
relatedness in the evolution of skew.
Intragroup aggression as a Junction of relatedness
Few studies of cooperatively breeding vertebrates have exam-
ined intragroup aggression in detail. Jamieson (1997) found
that groups of communally breeding pukeko with higher in-
tragroup relatedness (and higher skews) exhibited higher lev-
els of within-group aggression, in strong accordance with op-
timal skew, and not incomplete control, models. Emlen and
Wrege (1992). also reported the greatest harrassment levels
between the most closely related pairs in white-fronted bee-
eater families. Similarly, colonies of die naked mole rat {Htt-
erocephahis giaber), the vertebrate society exhibiting the high-
est known worker-breeder relatedness (r = 0.81, due to ex-
tensive inbreeding; Reeve et al., 1990) also exhibit an ex-
tremely high skew for both males and females (Sherman et
aL, 1991) and frequent, often intense, intracolony aggression
(e.g., Reeve, 1992).
As reviewed by Keller and Reeve (1994), unrelated ant foun-
dress queens fail to display dominance behavior, in vivid con-
trast to associations of closely related wasps queens in which
skews are higher and dominance behavior can be intense.
Moreover, intracolony aggression positively correlates with
both skew and aggression' across multiple-queen leptothora-
tine ant species (Bourke and Heinze, 1994). Overall, die few
T«We4
Reproductive ricew in polvgynoitf (ihared reproduction) and
mottogvnooa (monopolized reproduction) znuhiqaeen -coloine* of
lcptotbutuiue ants
Specie* Relatedness
Potygynous
Leptothorax canadensis
Leptothorax actrvorum
Leptothorax wtuscorum
Leptothorax awMguus
Leptothorax longispinosus
Functionally monogynous
Leptothorax gredUri
0.56
0.50
0.19
0.S4
0.51
0.60
Data from Heinze (1995).
data on die relationships among relatedness, skew, and ag-
gression clearly favor die optimal skew models.
Reproductive skew as a function of ecological constraints on
independent breeding
The classical skew model predicts diat reproductive skew
should increase widi decreasing expected success of indepen-
dent breeding (low x), whereas die incomplete control model
predicts no such direct connection. In a remarkable study,
Bourke and Heinze (1994) investigated die factors underlying
variation in reproduction among nest-mate queens in die
tribe Leptothoracini, a group of ants particularly suitable for
such studies because of dieir extreme diversity in social or-
ganization. They found diat die degree of reproductive skew
increases with greater ecological constraints on dispersal, as
predicted by optimal skew models. Peters et aL (1995) showed
diat reproductive dominance tends to increase over time in
queen associations in die social wasp Polistes annularis, a re-
sult diat supports die classical skew prediction if, as seems
likely, ecological constraints on independent nesting increase
as die colony cycle progresses (Reeve, 1991).
Among vertebrates, we know of data for only diree avian
species, die pukeko, die white-fronted bee-eater, and me Ga-
lapagos mockingbird (Nesomimus parvutus). In die first, skew
was much greater at Shakespear (North Island) where ecolog-
ical constraints were severe dian at Otokia (South Island)
where diey were weak (Jamieson, 1997). In die latter two,
skew varied between years, being lowest in years when ecolog-
ical conditions were most benign (Emlen, 1982a; Curry,
1988). Clearly, much more data are required to test diese pre-
dictions for bodi vertebrate and invertebrate societies.
DISCUSSION
Reproductive skew models (or- "concession models" as re-
cently termed by Qutton-Brock, in press) have generated con-
siderable interest recendy on bodi dieoretical and empirical
levels. However, rigorous testing of optimal skew models has
been hampered by die lack of any formal alternatives. The
two incomplete control models developed here represent
clear-cut and testable alternatives.
In Ha««ii-al optimal skew models, a basic assumption is diat
die dominant individual controls die distribution of repro-
duction in a group. Shared reproduction, when it occurs, re-
sults from die dominant yielding (conceding) just enough re-
production to subordinates to make it favorable for die latter
to remain in die group and cooperate peacefully. In die in-
complete control models, diis assumption is relaxed and dom-
inant and subordinate directly compete to increase their re-
spective fractions of die total reproduction. Shared reproduc-
tion in diese models results from die inability of die dominant
to profitably monopolize die group's reproduction. The effort
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expended in reproductive competition is assumed to entail a
cost, however, and that cost is a decrease in total group re-
productive output The incomplete models solve for the op-
timal amount of effort expended by both participants and
allow calculation of the resulting partitioning of reproduction
between them.
The two categories of models should be easily distinguish-
able because they make divergent predictions about the allo-
cation of reproduction in groups. The central prediction of
the incomplete control model is that reproductive skew
should decrease with, or be insensitive to, increasing genetic
relatedness among group members when this relatedness is
symmetrical among them. This contrasts with the prediction
of classical optimal skew models that reproductive monopoli-
zation should increase with increasing relatedness. When re-
latedness is asymmetrical, as often is the case when subordi-
nate offspring are associated with dominant parents, repro-
duction by offspring is more likely in the optimal skew models
than in the incomplete control models if the group is larger
than a dyad and consists of any mixture of full-sibling and
unrelated subordinates. Finally, the incomplete control mod-
els predict that skew should be insensitive to the magnitude
of ecological constraints (the probability of successful dispers-
al and independent reproduction by the subordinate). In clas-
sical skew models, however, the amount of reproduction con-
ceded by the dominant to the subordinate increases with de-
creasing ecological constraints.
The available data, from both vertebrate and hymenopteran
societies currently support the classical optimal skew models,
but this conclusion remains tentative. Much more genetic and
behavioral data are required to adequately test either model
Unfortunately, the terminology of skew theory has led to
misunderstandings about what optimal skew theory assumes
and predicts, resulting in some erroneous claims about what
kinds of data would reject the theory. For example, the idea
of a dominant's "conceding" reproduction in return for fa-
vorable actions, in essence the notion of social contracts
(Reeve and Nonacs, 1992), may seem to assume a sophisticat-
ed, conscious, decision-making process. This is not the case.
Selection operating on simple decision rules (behavioral
"rules-of-thumb") can often lead to sophisticated, context-de-
pendent behavioral actions (e.g. Dunbar, 1984; Emlen, 1997a;
Emlen et al., 1995; Stephens and Krebs, 1986). Complex cog-
nition is not assumed by optimal skew dieory. The only re-
quirements are mechanisms for monitoring one's
reproduction relative to others, reducing attempted repro-
duction when the latter exceeds some pre-programmed or
movable threshold, and increasing aggression or leaving the
group when this relative reproduction falls short of some fixed
or flexible threshold. Indeed, the minimal cognitive abilities
presupposed by optimal skew theory seem hardly more com-
plex than those assumed by incomplete control theory.
Similarly, the fact that intense aggression and active breed-
ing suppression are observed within groups might mistakenly
be taken as evidence refuting models based on reproductive
concessions. But again, this need not be so. Accurate assess-
ment of relative status and resource-holding power are as-
sumed and incorporated into optimal skew models as welL In
fact, as the reprductive skew increases (all else being equal),
skew theory predicts higher levels of testing by subordinates
and consequently of demonstration of status by dominants.
This is because the payoff for detection of a reversal in fight-
ing ability for the subordinate increases along with (he Skew
(Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993). Aggression is thus expected to
be part of the mechanistic process by which the stable parti-
tioning of reproduction is established and maintained in the
optimal skew models.
The exchange of "bribes" provides a further illustration of
how observed aggression can be fully compatible with optimal
skew theory. In a recent extension of optimal skew theory,
Reeve and Keller (1997) showed that dominants and subor-
dinates will be favored to yield reproduction to each other
("bribe" each other) to suppress destructive, selfish acts (i.e.,
acts that reduce overall group output while increasing the ac-
tor's share of die reproduction). Thus, aggression within
groups may simply be selfish threats performed to secure re-
productive bribes (Reeve and Keller, 1997). Moreover, bribing
provides a mechanism by which dominants and subordinate*
can mutually suppress the selfish efforts assumed in the in-
complete control models, thus causing the partitioning of re-
production to approach that predicted by the optimal skew
models.
Suppose that a dominant is selected to provide a small bribe
to a subordinate in addition to the latter's staying incentive.
In this case, the subordinate's reproduction would be above
the minimum staying incentive, just as in the incomplete con-
trol models. However, it will still be true that increasing relat-
edness will increase the reproductive skew because the mag-
nitudes of bribes (like staying incentives) are predicted to de-
crease with increasing relatedness (Reeve and Keller, 1997).
In other words, since both staying incentives and any added
bribes should decrease in magnitude with increasing related-
ness, it must be true that the subordinate's total share of the
reproduction should decrease with increasing relatedness.
Both bribe and optimal skew models are examples of a
transactional paradigm in which dominants yield reproduc-
tion to subordinates to reap some benefit (retaining a sub-
ordinate, in the case of a staying incentive, or preventing it
from engaging in a selfish act destructive to the group, in die
case of a bribe). For both models, the amount of a reproduc-
tive payment (concession) necessary to induce a subordinate
to engage in some behavior beneficial to the dominant will
always decrease with increasing relatedness between them.
The relative applicability of optimal skew versus incomplete
control models has rather profound implications for our un-
derstanding of die evolution of animal societies. If die optimal
skew models are correct, tile possibility of a truly unified the-
ory of social evolution is greatly enhanced because these mod-
els provide a fairly straightforward theoretical apparatus for
Unking tile ecology and genetic structure of societies to their
reproductive partitioning and patterns of intragroup conflict.
If the incomplete control models are correct, this linkage is
largely severed, and the models describing internal social dy-
namics will have to be decidedly more "local" (i.e., tailored
quite differently to different social systems).
Even more fundamentally, the two different kinds of models
entail different views about die degree of sophistication in
interactions between members of an animal society. In the
incomplete control model, interactants are engaged in a tug-
of-war struggle over resources, but in die optimal skew and
bribe models, organisms are engaged in higher-order trans-
actions—exchanges of parcels of reproduction designed to in-
duce recipients to behave in a more favorable way. It is of
fundamental importance to determine if the latter transac-
tional view applies outside of humans, not only to nonhuman
vertebrate societies but also to invertebrate societies. If so, the
implication will be that we have previously underestimated the
power of selection to design social behaviors of considerable
intricacy and subtlety in the absence of cognitive complexity.
APPENDIX
Why is skew virtually insensitive to relatedntss in the
subordinate inefficiency moddT
The change in the dominant's evohitionarily stable effort with
small changes in relatedness is given by dxm/dr which is — (x
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+ by)/2(\ - r). Similarly, dy*/dr is - ( x + by)/2b(l - r).
These expressions mean (roughly) that y* changes 1/Jas fast
as x* for a given change in r, both change in the same direc-
tion, but since b < 1, j * will tend to change faster. The dom-
inant's share of reproduction is x*/(x* + by*), which is more
sensitive to changes in x* than y* because b < 1. Thus, al-
though y* changes faster than x* a change in y* has a lesser
effect than a change in x* on the skew, the net result is virtual
insensitrvity of the skew to relatedness.
In the incomplete control models, zero reproduction is predicted '
for subordinate offspring when associated with a singly mated
parent (parent and offspring have the same relatednesses to
other group members)
Subordinate inefficiency model Let y be the subordinate off-
spring's effort (with efficiency b), x be the effort of the singly
mated parent (with efficiency d), and z be the summed efforts
of the other group members. The offspring has an asymmet-
rical relatedness of 1 to its parent and 1 to itself. Thus, by
Equation 8, the offspring's inclusive fitness can be written as
rcz + dx + by
cx+ dx + by
(1 - x - y - i) , (15)
where c represents the combined "efficiency" of the other
group members and is equal to c =• [(Ic^/iix^] and ris
the effective mean relatedness to other group members and
is equal to r = [(ZTJ^JX,)/(Iqxj] (these summations over the
other group members allow us to collapse all other group
members conveniently into a single "individual"). The parent
has an asymmetrical relatedness of V4 to its offspring and 1 to
itself. We assume that the parent has the same (or lesser)
relatedness to other group members as does the offspring.
This will be true for most kinds of groups, e.g., groups with a
parent and multiple offspring or with a parent and any mix-
ture of offspring and unrelated individuals. (It would not be
true of a group containing a parent, an offspring, and the
offspring's first cousin.) Thus, the parent's inclusive fitness is
rcz+ dx+
a + dx + by
(1 - x - y - z). (16)
Zero effort and thus zero reproduction by the subordinate will
be the evolutionarily stable strategy when dh/dyr-ox-M*j-r <
0. We thus calculate dLj/dy with y set equal to zero and with
r set equal to the value for which dld/Sy^oj-iv-i- = 0 (taking
into account the parent's maximization of its own personal
reproduction). This yields
- ( < * - - x* - z»)
d(\ - z*) + cz* (17)
which is negative if the parent
is dominant to the offspring (d > b). Thus, the offspring will
not exert any effort and will not reproduce under the as-
sumed conditions.
Restricted access model Using Equation 14 for the inclusive
fitnesses, we proceed exactly as above for the subordinate in-
efficiency model, obtaining 3L/dy_oji-*\i-i« "* 0. This means
y is at a local maximum at y = 0, because it can be shown
that 3tlt/dySj.Oj-x's-f < 0- Again, the offspring will not exert
any effort and thus will not reproduce under the assumed
conditions.
Dominant effort decreases with relatedness when there is
constant subordinate effort
Hamilton's rule implies that the optimal level of general ef-
fort, «*, for the dominant will be that which maximizes the
inclusive fitness quantity
[1 - p(e)]k(e) + rp{e)k{t), (19)
where p(e) is the subordinate's fraction of reproduction,
which is a decreasing function of the dominant's effort e [i.e.,
dp(e)/de < 0] and k(e) is the total group output, which is a
decreasing function of t [i.e., dk(e)/de < O\. By the implicit
function theorem of calculus, the rate of change of the dom-
inant's optimal effort, e* with relatedness is
Be*/dr = -
diw(t)/det at t = e* (20)
If the dominant's optimal effort corresponds to an internal
inclusive fitness maximum (i.e. an intermediate peak in inclu-
sive fitness, since we assume in the incomplete control model
that the dominant is favored to exert a less-than-maximal ef-
fort), then the denominator is negative. The numerator also
must be negative given that dp(e)/de < 0 and dk(e)/dt < 0, so
it follows that de*/dr must be negative (i.e., the dominant's
optimal effort and thus the skew should decrease with increas-
ing relatedness).
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